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Toward the Personalization of Copyright 
Law 
Adi Libson† & Gideon Parchomovsky†† 
In this Essay, we provide a blueprint for personalizing copyright law in order 
to reduce the deadweight loss that stems from its universal application to all users, 
including those who would not have paid for it. We demonstrate how big data can 
help identify inframarginal users, who would not pay for copyrighted content, and 
we explain how copyright liability and remedies should be modified in such cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
The dominant justification for copyright protection is that it 
is necessary to remedy an underproduction problem that arises 
from the public-good nature of expressive works.1 According to 
economic theory, public goods display two characteristics: non-
rival consumption and nonexcludability of benefits.2 The former 
trait implies that the use of a copyrighted work by one individu-
al does not diminish consumption opportunities for others. The 
latter means that even users who did not pay for the provision of 
copyrighted content benefit from it. Furthermore, once a work is 
produced, it can be copied by others and offered to the public at 
a price that does not allow the original authors to recoup the in-
vestment required to produce the work. Without legal protec-
tion, therefore, not enough copyrighted works would be created. 
The legal exclusivity granted to copyright owners is intend-
ed to prevent unauthorized use of copyrighted content and en-
sure that authors are remunerated for their creative labors. The 
authors’ monetary rewards come from voluntary market trans-
actions between the authors and users of the works. To prevent 
 
 † Assistant Professor, Bar-Ilan University School of Law. 
 †† Robert G. Fuller Jr Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325, 326 (1989). 
 2 See Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory 
of Intellectual Property, 88 Va L Rev 1455, 1466 n 42 (2002). 
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attempts at bypassing the market, copyright law imposes sanc-
tions on unauthorized users of copyrighted material.3 
Critically, though, from an economic perspective, our copy-
right system does not represent a first-best solution. The grant 
of legal exclusivity to authors introduces the problem of su-
pracompetitive (or monopolistic) pricing. Consequently, users 
who would have been willing to buy at the competitive price are 
denied access to content. And the penalties that are imposed on 
all unauthorized users come with a social cost: they drive away 
potential users of copyrighted content who derive positive value 
but cannot afford to pay the asking price. Preventing such users 
from accessing copyrighted works decreases their welfare with-
out enhancing the creators’ incentives to create because these 
potential users never provide any revenue for sellers. 
The existence of big data regarding the characteristics of 
copyright users can fundamentally transform copyright law by 
significantly decreasing its social cost. Big data can facilitate the 
personalization of copyright law via differentiating between pay-
ing users, who potentially attribute a higher value to the content 
than the asking price, and inframarginal users, who most likely 
will attribute a lower value to the content than the asking price 
and barely participate actively in the copyright market. Copy-
right law could differentiate between the penalties that would 
be imposed on different types of users who infringe copyrights, 
imposing high penalties on the paying user and low penalties on 
the inframarginal user. Such personalization is welfare enhanc-
ing, compared to the existing regime, as it will increase the use 
of copyrighted content. 
The use of big data can also help bring about a fairer and 
more efficient copyright enforcement regime. At present, all un-
authorized users are treated similarly, irrespective of whether 
they would have paid for the right to use the work. While en-
forcement against users who could afford to pay the asking price 
is vital for the successful operation of our copyright system, the 
imposition of sanctions on inframarginal users is welfare dimin-
ishing, as it denies them a benefit that inflicts no harm on copy-
right owners. A prior study by one of us suggested personalizing 
copyright protection by granting copyright holders a basic set of 
 
 3 See 17 USC § 504. See also Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 328–29 (cited 
in note 1) (discussing the market dynamics between the author’s assumption of copyright 
protection for her work and the disincentive created by the potential that the work will 
be copied without authorization). 
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protections and allowing them to decide whether to purchase 
additional levels of protection.4 In this proposal, we suggest per-
sonalizing copyright protection based on certain characteristics 
of copyright users through the utilization of big data. 
We analyze data that contain demographic characteristics of 
consumers of copyrighted content in order to detect cohorts that 
abstain from purchasing such content. We focus on purchases of 
audio and video content. We utilize two sources of data that com-
plement one another. The first source is data from the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which 
provide us with a general picture of audio and video purchases.5 
The second is panel data from ComScore, which include detailed 
information regarding the online consumption patterns of over 
eighty thousand households from various backgrounds, includ-
ing their full demographic characteristics. Analysis of these data 
sets enables us to detect potential groups with a low propensity 
to purchase copyrighted material based on cross-sections of de-
mographic categories, such as household education and racial 
background. 
Our empirical analysis is only the first step in utilizing big 
data for the purpose of personalizing copyright law. In order to 
identify accurately the individuals who would not purchase cop-
yrighted content, it is necessary to work with a much bigger da-
ta set than that which was available to us. Concretely, one would 
need to establish or compile a more comprehensive data set based 
on a larger sample that includes panel data and maybe even be-
havioral categories. It would also be useful to create a data set 
that tracks the consumption of different genres. The purpose of 
our admittedly partial analysis is only to demonstrate the gen-
eral feasibility of deducing from even basic demographic data 
the probability that a certain household would not buy copy-
righted materials and the general form in which a personalized 
copyright regime should be molded. 
Our argument and results give rise to several implications 
for legal policy. First, by enabling differential pricing of copy-
righted content, personalized consumption data will reduce the 
deadweight loss associated with copyright protection. Second, 
 
 4 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent, 113 
Mich L Rev 231, 255–59 (2014). 
 5 See Table 1110. Deciles of Income before Taxes: Annual Expenditure Means, 
Shares, Standard Errors, and Coefficients of Variation, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 
2016 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, Aug 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/S5BK-9KAU. 
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the consumption patterns we report suggest that a more limited 
copyright regime should apply to certain cohorts with a lower 
propensity to purchase content. Third, and relatedly, based on our 
findings, we propose varying the sanctions imposed for unauthor-
ized uses of copyrighted content based on user characteristics. 
Structurally, our Essay is comprised of five parts. In Part I, 
we present the data sources that offer information about the 
consumption patterns of copyrighted content and the character-
istics of the consumers. In Part II, we analyze the data we col-
lected and summarize our empirical findings. In Part III, we dis-
cuss the significance, as well as the limitations, of our findings. 
In Part IV, we assess the implications of our findings for copy-
right law and policy. In Part V, we explain why the market alone 
would not lead to a full personalization of copyright law and 
hence why legal intervention is warranted. In the Conclusion, we 
identify the central attribute of our argument and briefly ad-
dress its applicability to the consumption of other public goods. 
I.  GENERAL AND EXPENDITURE SURVEY DATA 
Until recently, user-specific pricing was considered a purely 
theoretical possibility, and its implementation in the real world 
was deemed unrealistic.6 The emergence of big data regarding 
the characteristics of users of copyrighted works will go a long 
way toward turning this theoretical possibility into reality. 
There exist abundant data regarding the characteristics of vari-
ous types of users who consume music and movies.  
Since 2016, online listening has been the most dominant form 
of music consumption.7 According to the 2016 Nielsen Music 
Year-End Report, on-demand audio streaming comprises 38 per-
cent of total audio consumption in the United States.8 It is on 
the rise, and a steep rise it is: it has grown 76.4 percent relative 
to the figures from 2015.9 Movie and video consumption has also 
shifted toward streaming: 2016 was the first year in which the 
 
 6 See Joel Waldfogel, First Degree Price Discrimination Goes to School, 63 J Indust 
Econ 569, 569 (2015) (“Person-specific pricing, also known as ‘first-degree price discrimina-
tion,’ is discussed in essentially every microeconomics textbook and class, but it is normally 
invoked more as an intellectual benchmark than as an example of real-world pricing.”). The 
economist Arthur Pigou has termed user-specific pricing “discrimination of the first de-
gree.” See A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 278–80 (Macmillan 4th ed 1932). 
 7 Nielsen Music Year-End Report, U.S. 2016 *3 (Nielsen, Jan 9, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/KED8-2G7E. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id at *6. 
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majority of Americans (50.8 percent) watched a TV show online 
at least once a month.10 This is a 3 percentage point jump from 
2015, in which only 47.8 percent of Americans watched a show 
online at least once a month.11 According to the 2017 Nielsen 
Video 360° Report, 52 percent of survey respondents claimed 
that they had not purchased a physical video in 2016.12 Online 
streaming consumption significantly increases the ability to 
track and extract specific information regarding the characteris-
tics (name, geographic location, age, gender, and many more) 
and behavior of the consumer through obtaining browser activi-
ty and cross-checking with other databases, such as credit-score 
bureaus and online consumption of alternative services. 
The high commercial value of the information regarding the 
characteristics of consumers of music and movies has prompted 
business enterprises, such as ComScore,13 Quantcast,14 and 
Musicwatch,15 to establish big data sets on users. Other busi-
nesses, such as Tellapart, have collected general data regarding 
consumers’ characteristics and behavior and advised firms on 
how to utilize this information.16 While this information is avail-
able, it is very expensive to obtain due to its high commercial 
value.17 In this Essay, we utilize a large set of data collected by 
ComScore in order to demonstrate the feasibility of detecting the 
profiles of consumers with a low probability of purchasing copy-
righted content.18 Our data set focuses on the purchase of audio 
 
 10 For the First Time, More than Half of Americans Will Watch Streaming TV 
(eMarketer, Feb 3, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/GNF7-6HBU. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Video 360° 2017 Report Highlights *2 (Nielsen, Aug 24, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7VWG-9E2A. 
 13 Audience Analytics (ComScore, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/5HU3-ANAN. 
 14 Quantcast Audience Grid: The Open Data Platform for Digital Advertising 
(Quantcast, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/BR4F-ZFX8. 
 15 Research Studies (MusicWatch, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/VRJ3-ZDP4.  
 16 TellApart, acquired by Twitter in 2015, used commerce data to help companies 
personalize their advertisement campaigns. See Twitter to Acquire TellApart (Twitter, 
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/P94D-NQFS. For information regarding a business 
providing similar services that TellApart took over—Freshplum—and other competitors, 
see Adam Tanner, Different Customers, Different Prices, Thanks to Big Data (Forbes, 
Mar 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UW5W-WQS6. 
 17 For example, the cost of ComScore panel data for one year, which is the data an-
alyzed in this Essay, is $20,000 even for academic institutions. The same panel data for 
a range of a few years can reach $100,000, and this is relatively cheap compared to more 
expensive behavioral data ComScore offers regarding users’ browsing activity and not 
only their purchasing behavior. 
 18 Consumption Analysis (ComScore, Apr 18, 2018), online at http://wrds 
-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds (Perma archive unavailable) (visited Dec 31, 2018). 
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and video content. The analysis of the ComScore data is instruc-
tive of how it is possible to utilize existing big data to detect 
population segments with a low propensity to purchase copy-
righted content. In addition, we use Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Expenditure Survey data, which is a useful complement to our 
other data sources, although it is less extensive than the 
ComScore data.19 We utilize an analysis of the 2010 Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Expenditure Survey data published by New 
Strategist in Best Customers: Demographics of Consumer 
Demand.20 
According to the Best Customers data, while the expendi-
ture of an average household on audio streaming and download-
ing is $6.70, households in which the householder is age 
seventy-five and above spend an average of $0.55.21 In contrast, 
the average monthly spending of households in which the 
householder is age thirty-five to forty-four is $10.81—almost 
twenty times as much.22 The Best Customers Index score—
which is based on the ratio of the groups’ average expenditures 
to the general population’s average expenditures,23 indicating 
the group’s propensity to make purchases in a given category—
is 8 for the former group and 161 for the latter.24 
Households with annual incomes of less than $20,000 spend 
less than a third of what the average household spends on audio 
streaming and downloads.25 The average household spends an 
average of $6.70 per month on streaming and downloading mu-
sic, while households with annual incomes of less than $20,000 
spend an average of $1.90.26 In contrast, households with annual 
incomes of $100,000 or more spend over three times more than 
the average household on copyrighted content online, and over 
ten times more than households with incomes of less than 
$20,000.27 The former group scores 28 on the Best Customers 
Index, while the latter scores 303.28 
 
 19 Table 1110, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2016 (cited in note 5). 
 20 New Strategist Publications, ed, Best Customers: Demographics of Consumer 
Demand 146 (New Strategist 9th ed 2012). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id at 3. 
 24 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 146 (cited in note 20). 
 25 Id at 147. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 147 (cited in note 20). 
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Household type also affects the probability that a household 
will spend resources on streaming and downloading audio. A 
household with a married couple in which the oldest child is be-
tween the ages of six and seventeen spends an average of $16.15 
on consumption of audio content, which gives it a score of 241 on 
the Best Customers Index, while a household consisting of a sin-
gle parent with one or more children under eighteen will spend 
an average of $2.38, which gives it a score of 36 on the Index.29 
Black households spend an average of $4.24 (a score of 63), while 
non-Hispanic whites spend an average of $7.44 (a score of 111).30 
Education appears to be an even more important factor. 
There appears to be a strong positive correlation between educa-
tion level and consumption of copyrighted content. A household 
with no high school graduates spends an average of $0.87 on digi-
tal audio content (a score of 13), while a household with a holder 
of a master’s degree spends an average of $16.18 (a score of 241).31 
Region may also affect users’ propensity to consume copy-
righted content: an average southern family spends $5.12 (a 
score of 76), while an average midwestern household spends an 
average of $8.33 (a score of 124).32 The data further indicate that 
a black southern family with a child under the age of eighteen 
and a single parent age seventy-five and above who has not 
graduated high school has a virtually zero probability of spend-
ing money on streamed or downloaded audio.33 
The data regarding spending on streaming and downloading 
of video content based on income are not fundamentally differ-
ent. While, in general, the effect of income on the categories of 
consumption is weaker, there are other categories in which the 
differences are more pronounced. The effect of household income 
on expenditures in this category is weaker: the average monthly 
 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 147 (cited in note 20). 
 33 We have not been able to obtain the full data set on which the analysis of the Best 
Customers Index relies. The data available online from the Bureau of Labor Statistics have 
only a general category for entertainment and do not split it into its components. See 
Table 1110: Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2016 (cited in note 5). As a result, we are not 
able to determine at this stage the interdependence of these factors, and thus we are un-
able to determine the exact probability that such a household would spend resources on 
this category. Nonetheless, the data regarding expenses on streaming and downloading 
video content expose that the correlation between the categories is not very strong. The 
relationship between the categories is fairly different in the two cases, negating the pos-
sibility of strong interdependence. 
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spending of a household with an income of less than $20,000 is 
$0.57, while that of a household with an income of above $100,000 
is $4.98.34 The score of the latter on the Best Customers Index is 
257, which is significantly lower than the score of 303 it receives 
on the streaming and downloading of audio content.35 
The differences are also less pronounced among different 
household types. The household type with the highest average 
consumption (married couples with children aged six to seven-
teen) spends on average $3.04, while the household type with 
the lowest (single parents with children under the age of eight-
een) spends an average of $0.80.36 This means that the differ-
ence in spending between the highest and lowest categories is 
only four-to-one, significantly less than the gap in audio con-
sumption, which was almost eight times greater.37  
Yet in some demographic categories, the difference is more 
pronounced for video. Black households spend an average of 
$0.80 in comparison to non-Hispanic white households, which 
average $2.11—over two and a half times more.38 For audio, 
they spend less than two times more.39 Black households’ Best 
Customers Index score drops from 63 for audio to 41 for video.40 
II.  ANALYSIS OF COMSCORE DATA 
There are two methods by which ComScore reaches out to 
these households. The first is through the “Affiliate Program,” 
in which users receive direct invitations to download software 
that would enable ComScore to collect information about all 
browsing activity in the household.41 Users are not paid. The 
incentive to participate is intrinsic. The second is through 
third-party application providers that offer incentives to visi-
tors in exchange for exposing visitors to offers, including solici-
tations from ComScore.42 Yet no incentive is tied to the ac-
ceptance of the offer from ComScore.43 ComScore also collects 
 
 34 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 149 (cited in note 20). 
 35 Id at 147, 149. 
 36 Id at 149. 
 37 Id at 147, 149. 
 38 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 149 (cited in note 20). 
 39 See text accompanying note 30. 
 40 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 146–47 (cited in note 20). 
 41 ComScore Media Metrix Description of Methodology *3 (ComScore, Nov 2013), 
archived at http://perma.cc/P3T4-U3XZ. 
 42 Id at *4. 
 43 Id. 
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users’ household-level demographics, which it supplements 
with third-party data from Accudata and behavior-based model-
ing.44 ComScore panel data is weighted in order to reflect the 
universe of internet users in the United States.45 
We have obtained ComScore data for two categories of 
online purchases relevant to our Essay: Purchase of Music 
(ComScore category twenty-two) and Purchase of Movies and 
Videos (ComScore category twenty-three).46 The data set con-
tains observations for 81,417 households. It contains 3,315 ob-
servations of audio content purchased by households and 10,726 
observations of video content purchased by households. Because 
our main interest is the characteristics of households that do not 
buy copyrighted materials, we divided these households into two 
types: households that have purchased certain forms of copy-
righted material—audio or video—and households that have not 
purchased those forms of material. Because there are numerous 
households that have purchased one or more products in either 
category, the number of households that haven’t purchased any 
product is 1,577 for audio and 4,467 for video (see Tables 1 and 2). 
	  
 
 44 Id. 
 45 ComScore Methodology at *3 (cited in note 41). Yet even if perfectly weighted, 
this data set faces serious methodological limitations due to the selection biases of the 
individuals willing to share their browsing activity. This is especially relevant with re-
spect to the household income variable: even if the panel includes high-income house-
holds, it is questionable whether these households actually reflect the typical behavior of 
high-income households. The fact that they are willing to expose to third parties their 
browsing activity in exchange for some form of benefit reflects, to some extent, that their 
resources are limited. Otherwise they could have purchased an equivalent benefit with-
out exposing their browsing behavior to third parties. 
 46 There were no other categories useful for our purposes. ComScore does not have 
a category for streaming services—it does have a category of online content sales and 
online service subscriptions, but it does not include streaming services like Netflix for 
video and Spotify for audio. The reason for this is that, for such services, a one-time pur-
chase is sufficient to consume the service for a long period of time, and thus reviewing 
the purchases made online will not effectively capture these forms of consumption. 
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TABLE 1:  AUDIO CONTENT PURCHASES BY HOUSEHOLDS 
Audio Frequency Percent Cumulative 
0 79,840 98.06 98.06 
1 1,577 1.94 100.00 
Total 81,417 100.00  
TABLE 2:  VIDEO CONTENT PURCHASES BY HOUSEHOLDS 
Video Frequency Percent Cumulative 
0 76,950 94.51 94.51 
1 4,467 5.49 100.00 
Total 81,417 100.00  
 
For each of the households, the data contain nine parame-
ters: Education Level of the Head of Household, Census Region, 
Household Size, Oldest Age of the Head of Household, House-
hold Income, Racial Background, Connection Speed, Country of 
Origin, and Zip Code. 
We set out to examine whether these parameters are corre-
lated and have predictive power for whether a household with 
certain characteristics would purchase a protected copyright 
product. For this purpose, we ran a logistic regression, which is 
most fitting given the binary character of the dependent varia-
ble. For audio consumption, four of the independent variables 
were statistically significant: Racial Background and Age with 
strong significance (p < 0.01) and Census Region and Income 
with weaker significance (p < 0.05). Non–African American 
households (African American households are denoted by the 
number “3” in Table 3), older heads of households, and low-
income households have a higher probability of not purchasing 
audio content. Among the variables, racial background has the 
highest coefficient and therefore seems to have the strongest 
impact. 
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TABLE 3:  LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR AUDIO CONTENT 
PURCHASES 
Audio Coeff Std Err z P > |z| [95% Conf Interval] 
Most Education 
(Head of House-
hold) 
0.0586541 0.0338642 1.73 0.083 −0.0077184 0.1250266 
Census Region       
2 −0.240163 0.0829241 −0.29 0.772 −0.1865444 0.1385119 
3 −1.662921 0.0748991 −2.22 0.026 −0.3130917 −0.0194926 
4 −0.0343664 0.0849173 −0.40 0.686 −0.2008013 0.1320685 
Household Size −0.0048801 0.0207302 −0.24 0.814 −0.0455105 0.0357503 
Oldest Age Head of 
Household 
0.0761591 0.011749 6.48 0.000 0.0531315 0.0991867 
Household Income 0.0318705 0.0146177 2.18 0.029 0.0032204 0.0605206 
Racial Background       
2 −0.9354766 0.1186563 −7.88 0.000 −1.168039 −0.7029146 
3 −0.4714563 0.1202855 −3.92 0.000 −0.7072116 −0.2357011 
5 
−0.9063577 0.0922049 -9.83 0.000 −1.087076 −0.7256395 
Country of Origin       
1 0.1004516 0.0935218 1.07 0.283 −0.0828478 0.2837509 
_cons −4.496677 0.2318364 −19.40 0.000 −4.951068 −4.042286 
 
* For Census Region: 1 = North East, 2 = North Central, 3 = South, 4 = West. For Racial Background: 
1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American, 3 = Asian, 5 = Unknown. For Country of Origin: 1 = Hispanic, 2 = Non-
Hispanic. 
We have received similar results with regard to household 
consumption of video content. Racial Background and Age of 
Households remain strongly statistically significant (p < 0.01), 
joined by Region, which had enhanced statistical significance 
(p < 0.001). Household Income maintains its weaker statistical 
significance (p < 0.05), while Education loses its statistical sig-
nificance. 
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TABLE 4:  LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR VIDEO CONTENT 
PURCHASES 
Video Coeff Std Err z P > |z| [95% Conf Interval] 
Most Education 
(Head of 
Household) 
0.0123945 0.020856 0.59 0.552 −0.0284825 0.0532714 
Census Region 
      
2 −0.0981939 0.0508895 −1.93 0.054 −0.1979355 0.0015476 
3 −0.235507 0.0455328 −5.17 0.000 −0.3247496 −0.1462644 
4 −0.1264669 0.0523088 −2.42 0.016 −0.2289902 −0.0239435 
Household Size −0.0004744 0.0126332 −0.04 0.970 −0.025235 0.0242861 
Oldest Age 
Head of House-
hold 
0.0292329 0.006974 4.19 0.000 0.0155642 0.0429016 
Household In-
come 
0.0201468 0.0089904 2.24 0.025 0.0025259 0.0377677 
Racial Back-
ground 
      
2 −0.7697772 0.0662507 −11.62 0.000 −0.8996262 −0.6399281 
3 −0.3417903 0.070115 −4.87 0.000 −0.4792132 −0.2043674 
5 −0.8136661 0.0538913 −15.10 0.000 −0.9192911 −0.7080412 
Connection 
Speed 
1.105471 0.2273749 4.86 0.000 0.6598242 1.551117 
Country of 
Origin 
      
1 0.0929469 0.0568445 1.64 0.102 −0.0184662 0.20436 
_cons −3.814999 0.2644598 −14.43 0.000 −4.333331 −3.296668 
 
* For Census Region: 1 = North East, 2 = North Central, 3 = South, 4 = West. For Racial Background: 
1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American, 3 = Asian, 5 = Unknown. For Country of Origin: 1 = Hispanic, 2 = Non-
Hispanic. 
 
We have also checked for multicollinearity between the var-
iables—that is, whether the explanatory power of some of them 
is due to their correlation with other independent variables. One 
of the problems with the Best Customers data is that they did 
not enable us to check for multicollinearity. We found low levels 
of correlation between the dependent variables, which refutes 
the possibility of multicollinearity. The correlations between al-
most all of the independent variables are around 0.1 or lower—
except for the correlation between income and education, which 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3332961 
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scored 0.379, representing some degree of correlation but not a 
strong correlation. 
TABLE 5:  CORRELATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
M
o
st E
d
u
ca
tio
n
 
H
ea
d
 o
f H
o
u
se-
h
o
ld
 
C
en
su
s R
eg
io
n
 
H
o
u
seh
o
ld
 S
ize 
O
ld
est A
g
e H
ea
d
 
o
f H
o
u
seh
o
ld
 
H
o
u
seh
o
ld
 In
-
co
m
e 
R
a
cia
l B
a
ck
-
g
ro
u
n
d
 
C
o
u
n
try
 o
f 
O
rig
in
 
Most Education Head 
of Household 1.000       
Census Region 0.0562 1.000      
Household Size −0.0265 −0.0101 1.000     
Oldest Age Head of 
Household 
0.0369 −0.0169 −0.0887 1.000    
Household Income 
0.3796 −0.0195 0.1130 0.0160 1.000   
Racial Background 
−0.0357 0.0871 0.0594 −0.0949 −0.0436 1.000  
Country of Origin 
−0.0676 0.0660 0.0639 −0.0425 −0.0510 0.1768 1.000 
III.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Some of our findings, such as the lower expectancy of south-
erners to buy protected video and audio material and the lower 
expectancy of lower-income households to buy such material, re-
inforce the limited data from the Best Customers survey. 
The four statistically significant parameters enable us to de-
fine a cohort that does not consume any of the copyrighted ma-
terial we discuss in this Essay. In the case of audio, out of the 
cohort of southern households (Census Region = 3) in which the 
head of the household has no college degree (Most Education—
Head of Household ≤ 2) and is twenty-four years old or younger 
(Oldest Age Head of Household ≤ 2), and in which household in-
come is less than $100,000 (Household Income ≤ 15) and the ra-
cial background is not African American (Racial Back-
ground ≠ 3)—a cohort of 176 households—not one household 
purchased any copyrighted audio content online in 2016. 
In the case of video, in the cohort of southern households 
with incomes of less than $100,000 (Household Income ≤ 15) and 
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in which the head of household did not attend college (Most Ed-
ucation—Head of Household ≤ 1), is twenty-nine years old or 
younger (Oldest Age Head of Household ≤ 3), and whose racial 
background is not African American (Racial Background ≠ 3)—a 
cohort of seventy-two households—not one household purchased 
any copyrighted video content online in 2016. While this cohort 
is smaller than the one defined for nonconsumption of audio, its 
greater divergence from the mean of purchasing households, 
which was more than double that of audio (over 4 percent in 
comparison to over 2 percent), compensates for its smaller size. 
If these findings could have been extended to other forms of 
purchases and actually reflected the total consumption of copy-
righted content, a legal regime that reduced the liability of 
members of such households for copyright infringements—and 
even granted them complete immunity—would seem likely to 
have no effect on authors’ incentives to create. The expectation 
that such households would purchase copyrighted material is 
close to zero, and thus exempting them from liability would in-
crease the welfare of these defined cohorts without adversely af-
fecting the remuneration of authors. 
An important question that arises from the analysis of the 
data is: What should actually be measured, purchases or con-
sumption? Analysis of purchases provides information regarding 
the households’ actual willingness to pay. Yet some may argue 
that purchases are not necessarily the only relevant parameter. 
Rather, the relevant parameter may be valuation of the product, 
which is distinct from willingness to pay. There may be some 
households that attribute high value to the consumption of copy-
righted material but do not attribute high value to consuming 
this content legally. Even though they attribute high value to 
the consumption of content, they may not purchase it because 
they can download it illegally. Such households are potential 
customers of creators of content and would start paying if an ef-
fective enforcement mechanism were to arise. Thus, in order to 
fully estimate the potential customers of copyrighted content, 
one has to collect data regarding all forms of consumption of the 
product and not only purchases. How these data should be ana-
lyzed in order to deduce valuation from consumption is a sepa-
rate issue that should be addressed when the data are available. 
It is not necessarily true that consumption data are irrele-
vant for the purpose of personalizing copyright law. From the 
point of view of owners of protected content, what matters is the 
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actual purchases, not why one does not purchase—whether be-
cause of low valuation of the product or low valuation of legal 
consumption. It is true that, if the latter is correct, enhanced en-
forcement may increase the number of purchasing households. 
Yet our Essay is focused on personalization of copyright assum-
ing that enforcement level is fixed. 
Furthermore, it is possible to argue that the phenomenon of 
illegal consumption supports the adoption of personalized copy-
right law. If the demand for copyrighted material is relatively 
inelastic for certain households, and they would consume ap-
proximately the same level of copyrighted content legally or ille-
gally, social welfare may increase by transforming the consump-
tion of such households into legal forms of consumption. Illegal 
behavior constitutes a per se cost besides the social cost of the 
consequences of the illegal behavior. As Professor Robert Cooter 
has noted, “Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment 
that attaches a psychological penalty to a forbidden act.”47 Once 
an individual transgresses the law in one field and incurs the 
cost of being a transgressor, one is more likely to transgress the 
law in other fields—even if prior to that act, the individual 
would not have made these additional transgressions—because 
the first transgression reduces the marginal cost of the next.48 
 
 47 Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J Legal Stud 585, 586 (1998). 
For a discussion of the phenomenon of “self-concept maintenance” and its relevance to the 
legal field, see Yuval Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law and Economics, in 
Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and 
the Law 213, 222–23 (Oxford 2014). 
 48 This is an additional rationale for personalization of law—not different levels of 
benefits or direct social costs resulting from an action, but different indirect levels of so-
cial costs of the transgression per se. Certain types of individuals transgress a certain 
law but would not have transgressed if the legal prohibition had been limited to more 
severe acts, increasing the social cost of their classification as transgressors. 
 For example, the conventional way of applying personalized driving laws would be to 
differentiate between drivers who, driving at the same speed, impose different social 
risks. The more talented Type A drivers may impose only a 0.0001 risk of an accident 
when driving at sixty miles per hour, and reach a 0.001 risk level only when driving at 
seventy miles per hour. The less talented Type B drivers may reach the risk level of 
0.001 driving at sixty miles per hour. This is the conventional setting for personalizing 
the law: the law would prohibit driving while imposing more than a 0.001 risk of an ac-
cident, permitting Type A drivers to drive up to a speed of seventy miles per hour and 
Type B drivers to drive up to a speed of sixty miles per hour. 
 The rationale provided above would justify personalization of law even if individuals 
impose the same social cost at a given speed and receive the same personal benefit from 
driving fast, as long as they diverged in their valuations of driving legally. For example, 
Type C drivers, who do not attribute so much value to driving legally as to justify bar-
ring them from the benefit of driving at eighty miles per hour if the legal speed were six-
ty miles per hour, may still attribute sufficient value to driving legally to keep their 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL POLICY 
The availability of personalized consumption data has the 
potential to transform copyright law in three different ways: 
First, it will reduce the deadweight loss associated with copy-
right protection. Second, it calls for the adoption of differential 
statutory damages categories that take into account users’ pro-
pensities to pay for copyrighted content. Finally, it provides a 
prima facie case for exempting users with certain characteristics 
from copyright liability. We discuss these implications in order. 
A. Deadweight Loss 
It is a well-established result in the economic literature that 
copyright protection cannot yield a first-best result.49 Copyright 
law incentivizes creativity by conferring legal exclusivity on au-
thors. That same exclusivity allows creators to engage in su-
pracompetitive pricing. Copyright protection, therefore, invaria-
bly gives rise to a deadweight loss, represented by the loss of 
those users who would have purchased the content at the com-
petitive price but not at the supracompetitive price.50 Naturally, 
in a world with perfect information, copyright owners—indeed, 
all monopolists—would prefer to adopt a differential pricing 
scheme that allows them fully to extract the surplus of users.51 
Alas, copyright owners were unable until recently to figure 
out users’ reserve prices. The availability of personalized data 
about consumers allows copyright owners to offer content at 
 
speed at seventy miles per hour if that were the legally permitted speed. In contrast, 
Type D drivers, who attribute high value to driving legally, would drive at sixty miles 
per hour if that were the legally permitted speed. Such situations may also justify per-
sonalization. In order to avoid the social cost of turning Type D drivers into transgres-
sors, the legally permitted speed that would apply to them would be seventy miles per 
hour, while the one that would apply to Type C drivers would be sixty miles per hour. 
 This personalization may raise much greater fairness and equality concerns if we 
permit certain individuals to impose greater social risks than others. Yet it is possible to 
justify such personalization on fairness grounds because, in the same way progressive 
taxes are justified from an egalitarian perspective, they maintain equal sacrifice. Also, in 
this case, it can be argued that the personalized driving law maintains equal sacrifice of 
drivers for the sake of public safety. The subjective sacrifice that Type C drivers make 
for public safety is equivalent to the subjective sacrifice Type D drivers make for public 
safety. 
 49 See, for example, Bell and Parchomovsky, 113 Mich L Rev at 240–41 (cited in 
note 4); Danny Ben-Shahar and Assaf Jacob, Selective Enforcement of Copyright as an 
Optimal Monopolistic Behavior, 3 Contributions to Econ Analysis & Pol 1, 14–18 (2004); 
Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 351–52 (cited in note 1). 
 50 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 113 Mich L Rev at 240–41 (cited in note 4). 
 51 See id. 
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different prices to members of different groups. Actually, many 
of them are already taking advantage of this possibility. From a 
policy perspective, this dynamic has the salutary effect of dimin-
ishing the deadweight loss associated with copyright protection. 
The reduction in this deadweight loss should come as welcome 
news to both authors and users. Authors, for their part, will see 
greater rewards for their creative efforts. And more users will 
gain access to copyrighted content. 
It should be noted that personalization may also generate a 
deadweight loss. A personalized regime may generate a cost for 
an individual who wants an attribute on which the personaliza-
tion is based. For example, an individual may want to move 
from the southern United States to the Northeast. As a conse-
quence of the personalization of copyright protection based on 
one’s domicile, changing one’s residence might increase the price 
that one is charged for copyrighted content. This, in turn, might 
distort one’s decision about where to live. The distortion could 
also work in the opposite direction: a person whose preference is 
to live in the Northeast may choose to live in the South in order 
to decrease her expenses on consumption of copyrighted goods. 
While it is true, in principle, that a personalized copyright may 
not only eliminate a deadweight loss but also generate another, 
it seems that the deadweight it eliminates is much greater than 
the one it generates. First, personalization can also be based on 
parameters that the individual cannot alter, such as age, height, 
or ethnicity, and thus personalization will have no distortionary 
effect. Second, it is highly unlikely that the distortionary effect 
of personalization will be significant. The amount a household 
can save by reducing expenses on copyrighted content is negligi-
ble: as noted in the Best Customers Index, the average house-
hold spends $6.70 annually on audio copyrighted material.52 It is 
doubtful that this amount would cause any significant changes 
in an individual’s behavior. Changing one’s domicile in order to 
lower this amount would be highly irrational. The potential cost 
savings that can be realized by moving will be dwarfed by the 
moving costs. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that the social 
gains from the reduction of the deadweight loss of copyright pro-
tection via the creation of a personalized copyright regime would 
dominate the effect of enhancing a tax-like deadweight loss by 
distorting individuals’ behavior. 
 
 52 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 147 (cited in note 20). 
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B. Statutory Damages 
The Copyright Act of 197653 provides copyright owners with 
a wide array of remedies, including statutory damages.54 Statu-
tory damages have proven to be an especially popular remedy, 
as the actual harm suffered by copyright owners from various 
infringements is often very hard to prove and quantify.55 It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that statutory damages are the reme-
dy of choice for many copyright owners.56 Section 504(c) of the 
Copyright Act empowers owners to receive statutory damages that 
range between $750 and $30,000 for standard infringements.57 
At present, and this has always been the case historically, 
statutory damages are never adjusted based on user character-
istics. In the past, doing so was not even an option, as infor-
mation about the consumption patterns of users did not exist. 
Our analysis suggests that, in the future, it may be possible—
indeed, desirable—to vary statutory damages awards based on 
the personal characteristics of infringers. As we suggest, users 
with certain characteristics are highly unlikely to purchase cop-
yrighted content. If such individuals are sued for infringement, 
the damages imposed on them should reflect the fact that their 
infractions do not represent lost sales. New categories of lower 
statutory damages should be adopted, or at a minimum, courts 
and juries ought to adjust the awards granted under the present 
scheme against users from the groups we identify. 
Relatedly, the type of copyrighted work involved in the in-
fringement action must also be taken into account. Our analysis 
reveals that users’ consumption patterns vary among categories 
of works. Individuals with certain characteristics may abstain 
 
 53 Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, codified at 17 USC § 101 et seq. 
 54 17 USC § 504.  
 55 Indeed, the desire to help copyright owners overcome difficult evidentiary 
problems is often cited as the primary justification for allowing them to collect statu-
tory damages. See, for example, Colin Morrissey, Behind the Music: Determining the 
Relevant Constitutional Standard for Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement 
Lawsuits, 78 Fordham L Rev 3059, 3071–72 (2010); Stephanie Berg, Remedying the 
Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability: Balanc-
ing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J Copyright Society USA 265, 
274 (2009). 
 56 See Ben Depoorter, Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: When the Remedy 
Is the Wrong, 66 UCLA L Rev *7 (forthcoming 2019) (on file with authors) (reporting that 
“[p]laintiffs in copyright litigation request statutory damages in eight[y]-nine percent of 
cases”). 
 57 If the infringement is willful, the amount goes up to $150,000; in the case of an 
innocent infringement, courts can lower the amount to $200. See 17 USC § 504(c)(2). 
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from consuming a particular type of copyrighted works, say audio, 
and at the same time engage in heavy consumption of another 
category of protected content, say video. 
It may also be advisable to distinguish among consumer 
profiles of different genres of music and movies. Our data reveal 
that, among the purchasers of copyrighted content, there are 
certain cohorts whose expectancy of purchasing a particular 
genre may be close to zero. For example, consumers who are 
willing to pay for hip-hop music may abstain from buying coun-
try music (and vice versa). In determining statutory damages, 
courts ought to be mindful of this possibility. 
Aside from the general welfare argument for personalizing 
copyright infringement penalties, personalization according to 
genres may serve an additional purpose that some scholars be-
lieve is of high social value: enhancement of cultural diversity.58 
Enabling individuals to freely consume genres to which they 
would never have been exposed benefits all parties involved. 
C. Exempting Certain Users from Copyright Liability 
The most extreme version of a personalized copyright re-
gime would grant full immunity from copyright liability to co-
horts with an especially low propensity to purchase copyrighted 
content. Individuals within the cohort would be allowed to en-
gage in private consumption of copyrighted content free of risk 
and free of charge as long as they do not share the content with 
other individuals. While such a legal regime may appear ex-
treme, it is not unprecedented: in some legal systems, private 
usage, including even copying copyrighted material for private 
purposes, is permitted across the board.59 Our proposal is more 
moderate: permitting private use by members of certain cohorts. 
If the expectancy of purchases by members of a certain cohort is 
close to zero, permitting these individuals to consume the copy-
righted content would inflict only a minimal harm on copyright 
owners and would only slightly diminish their incentive to create. 
 
 58 See, for example, Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity 
and Political Theory 165–78 (Harvard 2000). Some justify cultural diversity from an eco-
nomic lens by referencing the positive externalities generated by cultural diversity. See, 
for example, Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, The Economic Value of 
Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US Cities, 6 J Econ Geography 9, 38 (2006). 
 59 For example, in Norway, copying copyrighted works for private use, such as 
downloading songs, is permitted. See Tarja Koskinen-Olsson, The Notion of Private 
Copying in Nordic Copyright Legislation in the Light of European Developments dur-
ing Recent Years, 49 J Copyright Society USA 1003, 1012–13 (2002). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3332961 
546 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:527 
	
A full immunity scheme has one central advantage over the 
alternative of reduced statutory damages. Both options aim at 
enabling wider use of copyrighted content by cohorts with low 
propensity to purchase. Yet the latter approach does so by in-
creasing the prevalence of an illegal activity: it decreases the 
cost of violating copyright law, but the nonpurchasing cohorts 
consuming copyright freely are still violating copyright law. In-
creasing copyright consumption by increasing the economic in-
centive to violate copyright law generates the additional social 
costs associated with violating the law detailed above. The for-
mer does not raise this problem. It does not increase copyright 
consumption of the nonpurchasing cohorts by increasing their 
economic incentive to violate the law. It excludes the legal limi-
tations of copyright from applying to such cohorts from the start 
and excludes them from being legally defined as violators. 
Yet the deferential penalty treatment may better suit cases 
in which the propensity of certain cohorts is low but not close to 
zero. In such cases, permitting the cohort to consume the copy-
right freely would damage the copyright. In contrast, lowering 
the effective sanction may function as a self-selection device, en-
abling individuals who would not otherwise purchase the copy-
right to consume it. 
V.  THE LIMITS OF MARKET-BASED PERSONALIZATION 
Theoretically, copyright owners can lower the price charged 
to almost zero for individuals who put a very low value on the 
use of copyrighted content and would not have used the content 
otherwise. This raises the question: If private actors have access 
to big data and can engage in price differentiation, why adopt a 
personalized copyright regime? One may argue that legal inter-
vention is unwarranted in this case because the market will in-
duce copyright owners to harness big data in order to engage in 
personalized pricing. 
There are several problems with this argument. First, the 
motivation of copyright owners to expend resources to capture 
low-value users critically depends on the legal regime that applies 
to the owners and defines the scope of their rights. Extant copy-
right law allows copyright owners to seek statutory damages be-
tween $750 to $30,000 for standard infringements60 and increases 
 
 60 17 USC § 504(c)(1). 
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the amount to up to $150,000 for willful infringements.61 These 
are significant amounts. Instead of engaging in price discrimina-
tion that would enable them to capture the surplus of low-value 
users, copyright owners are likely to find it in their interests to 
allow low-value users to breach and then sue for statutory dam-
ages. The availability of statutory damages under current law, 
therefore, changes the calculus of copyright owners. Against the 
current legal background, copyright owners will likely be better 
off if they forgo the opportunity to devise a comprehensive indi-
vidualized pricing scheme and adopt instead a strategy of selec-
tive enforcement.62 It should be borne in mind that, under the 
existing copyright system, inframarginal users are not exempt 
from liability. Collecting statutory damages even from a rela-
tively small percentage of inframarginal users is likely to be 
more cost-effective for most copyright owners than incurring the 
cost of offering them low prices, although it would clearly be less 
fair. 
Second, irrespective of the applicable legal regime, cost con-
straints may prevent copyright owners from reaching out to low-
value users. The graph below, in Figure 1, exemplifies this pos-
sibility through designating the demand curve for a certain cop-
yrighted content. Without price discrimination, copyright own-
ers would set the price at the monopoly price, designated Pmon. 
The owners’ surplus would be the square area marked with hor-
izontal lines, and the consumers’ surplus would be the area 
above that marked with vertical lines. When copyright owners 
shift to price discrimination, they add to their surplus the two 
areas marked with vertical lines. But price discrimination is 
cost-justifiable only to a certain point, designated Pmin. Beyond 
this point, it is not cost-effective for copyright owners to continue 
to expend resources on price discrimination even though theoret-
ically they could also add to their surplus the area marked in 
black. This is due, of course, to the cost associated with the prac-
tice of price discrimination. Price discrimination requires acquir-
ing data and analyzing it. Naturally, the acquisition of data can 
 
 61 17 USC § 504(c)(2). Willful infringement has been defined as covering situations 
in which (a) “the defendant was actually aware of the infringing activity, or” (b) “the de-
fendant’s actions were the result of ‘reckless disregard’ for, or ‘willful blindness’ to, the 
copyright holder’s rights.” See Island Software & Computer Service, Inc v Microsoft Corp, 
413 F3d 257, 263 (2d Cir 2005). 
 62 For a discussion of selective enforcement, which occurs when copyright holders 
enforce claims against only certain infringers, see generally Ben-Shahar and Jacob, 3 
Contributions to Econ Analysis & Pol 1 (cited in note 49). 
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be rather costly. For the group of individuals comprising the 
black-tailed area, it might not be worthwhile to acquire data re-
garding their willingness to pay. The expected price the copy-
right owners can obtain from this group of individuals is lower 
than the cost of obtaining data regarding each individual’s will-
ingness to pay. Hence, the copyright owners would abstain from 
price discriminating within that group altogether. 
FIGURE 1:  PRICE DISCRIMINATION AMONG COPYRIGHT 
OWNERS 
 
Because of the low amount that copyright owners can 
charge to the individuals comprising the black-tailed area, the 
transaction costs may exceed the expected price, making it un-
profitable for the owners to sell users the right to use the copy-
righted material in a market transaction. As a result, market-
based price discrimination would reduce the deadweight loss as-
sociated with copyright protection, but not within the black-
tailed area: it would bar those individuals from consuming the 
copyrighted material even though their consumption would have 
generated a net surplus equivalent to the area of the black-
tailed area. A personalized copyright regime internalizes this 
welfare loss that private actors do not internalize. Hence, a per-
sonalized copyright regime can eradicate the deadweight loss of 
copyright that market-based personalization leaves intact.63 
 
 63 There might be an additional justification for personalization of copyright, even 
in cases in which the inframarginal consumers attribute zero value to the copyrighted 
content and the black-tailed area does not exist. Under market-based personalization, if 
the inframarginal consumers attribute zero value to the copyrighted content, they would 
never consume the copyrighted material—no one would market the material to them be-
cause there is nothing to gain. In contrast, a personalized copyright regime would enable 
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CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, we laid out the case for adopting a personal-
ized copyright regime in which the penalties for copyright in-
fringement would be lowered for cohorts with a low propensity 
to purchase copyrighted content. Big data has already trans-
formed the ways in which copyrighted material is created.64 We 
argue that it should also transform the way copyright is protect-
ed in order to enhance social welfare. It is time for copyright law 
to join other legal fields, such as contracts65 and torts,66 in which 
scholars have argued that big data enables reforms and person-
alization of the legal standards in those fields, thereby enhanc-
ing efficiency. 
The logic of the argument in this Essay could apply to the 
consumption of public goods in general and, more specifically, to 
the field of taxation. The central attribute that enables the ap-
plication of our argument to copyright is that additional con-
sumption does not impose any additional costs on the manufac-
turers of the resources consumed (that is, copyrighted content). 
This is true also in the case of classic public goods, which have a 
central characteristic of being nonrival—that is, consumption of 
the resource by one individual does not preclude other individuals 
 
them to consume the copyrighted material at no cost. This may also seem pointless: if 
these individuals attribute zero value to the consumption of the copyrighted material, 
there is no social welfare gain even if they do consume the copyrighted material. Yet ac-
cording to certain approaches that attribute positive value to cultural diversity, such 
consumption may still have a positive value. Without a personalized copyright regime, 
those groups will never be exposed to the cultural experiences involved in using the 
copyrighted material, and thus society as a whole suffers a lack of cultural diversity. 
The positive value of cultural diversity exists within the welfare economics framework, 
because it generates positive externalities, or as a source of value per se outside the 
realm of conventional welfare economics. See, for example, Heritiana Ranaivoson, 
Does the Consumer Value Diversity? How the Economists’ Standard Hypothesis Is 
Being Challenged, in Marilena Vecco, ed, The Consumption of Culture, the Culture of 
Consumption: A Collection of Contributions on Cultural Consumption and Cultural 
Markets 70, 77–79 (Lambert 2012) (discussing the sociological and psychological bene-
fits of cultural diversity); David Throsby, The Economics of Cultural Policy 172–73 
(Cambridge 2010) (listing four benefits of cultural diversity as cultural capital). 
 64 See Michael D. Smith and Rahul Telang, Streaming, Sharing and Stealing: Big 
Data and the Future of Entertainment 3–15 (MIT 2016) (describing how Netflix changed 
the way in which TV series are produced, including by being willing to forgo the creation 
of a pilot episode, based on its big data regarding consumer preferences). 
 65 See Ariel Porat and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and 
Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich L Rev 1417, 1422–33 (2014). 
 66 See Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 NYU L 
Rev 627, 676–88 (2016). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3332961 
550 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:527 
	
from consuming the resource.67 It is possible to utilize big data to 
price discriminate between individuals consuming public goods 
in order to reach an optimal level of consumption of those public 
goods. This suggestion is not far from one of the major justifica-
tions for progressive taxation: the benefit principle.68 According 
to the benefit principle, one’s payment for public goods should be 
in proportion to the benefit or utility one derives from the exist-
ence of the public good.69 In this sense, levels of income serve as 
a proxy for the degree of benefit people derive from public 
goods.70 According to such logic, in an era of big data, there may 
be less reason to settle for such a rough proxy for the level of 
benefit: the tax system can use much more sophisticated param-
eters than income to measure the level of benefit that one de-
rives from public goods, and maybe even use those parameters 
to measure the level of benefit that one derives from the music 
that one purchases. 
 
 67 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev Econ & 
Statistics 387, 387 (1954). 
 68 Various forms of the benefit principle and the premise that underpins it—that 
taxation is a price for services rendered—were expressed by various classical thinkers, 
such as Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, and Pufendorf. For the historical intellectual roots of the 
principle, see Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public 
Economy 63–73 (McGraw-Hill 1959); Edwin R.A. Seligman, Progressive Taxation in The-
ory and Practice 79–86 (American Economic Association 1894). For its modern formula-
tion, as it is mostly identified, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 315–
16 (Chicago 1960). 
 69 Hayek, Constitution of Liberty at 315–16 (cited in note 68). 
 70 For arguments supporting the assumption that higher-income earners derive 
greater benefits from public goods, see Yoseph Edrey, Constitutional Review and Tax 
Law: An Analytic Framework, 56 Am U L Rev 1187, 1209–13 (2007); C. Eugene Steuerle, 
And Equal (Tax) Justice for All?, reprinted in Joseph J. Thorndike and Dennis J. Ventry 
Jr, eds, Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate 253, 261–63 (Urban Institute 2002). For an ex-
ample of how even a regressive tax provides more benefits to higher-income earners, see id 
at 268–70. But see Walter Blum and Harry Kalven Jr, The Uneasy Case for Progressive 
Taxation, 19 U Chi L Rev 417, 451–55 (1952). 
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